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Registration for Economic Experiments (December 2010 through January 2011)

Currently we are conducting economical experiments to test how our combinatorial auctions work. Every student can participate at our experiments.

Please Click Here to Register for our Economic Experiments

Welcome to the MarketDesigner project home

Multi-item auctions are common in industrial procurement and logistics, where suppliers are able to satisfy the buyer's demand for several items or lanes. Often purchasing managers package these items into pre-defined bundles the suppliers can bid on. Combinatorial auctions allow bidders to define their own bundles and bid on them, rather than just on individual items or bundles that are pre-defined by the auctioneer. This allows the bidders to better express their valuations and ultimately increases economic efficiency in the presence of synergistic values. CAs have already found application in various domains ranging from transportation to industrial procurement and allocation of spectrum licenses for wireless communication services.

MarketDesigner is a research project at the chair of Internet-based Information Systems (IBIS, Prof. Bichler) at TU München, Germany. We develop and analyze Combinatorial Auction formats focusing mainly applications in industrial procurement. The project is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). The team cooperates with the Canadian SSHRC eNegotiations program.